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Abstract
Interbank contagion can theoretically exacerbate losses in a financial system and lead to additional cascade defaults during
downturn. In this paper we produce default analysis using both regression and neural network models to verify whether interbank
contagion offers any predictive explanatory power on default events. We predict defaults of U.S. domiciled commercial banks in
the first quarter of 2010 using data from the preceding four quarters. A number of established predictors (such as Tier 1 Capital
Ratio and Return on Equity) are included alongside contagion to gauge if the latter adds significance. Based on this methodology,
we conclude that interbank contagion is extremely explanatory in default prediction, often outperforming more established metrics,
in both regression and neural network models. These findings have sizeable implications for the future use of interbank contagion
as a variable of interest for stress testing, bank issued bond valuation and wider bank default prediction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the stability of
established economic models came under scrutiny, leading to
greater exploration of dynamic and macro-prudential methods
that prioritize relationships between financial agents over their
standalone characteristics.
Among these is the study of interbank contagion, a subset of
financial contagion seeking to quantify how the structure of
linkages between banks’ liabilities exacerbate loss propagation
across the wider financial system.
Over the past decade, interbank contagion has been exten-
sively covered in academic literature and widely adopted by
regulators, with an extensive number of official bodies such
as the IMF (Ozkan & Unsal, 2012), the Bank of England
(Bardoscia et. al, 2017) the Federal Reserve (Morrison et. al,
2017) and the European Central Bank (Haaj & Kok, 2013),
including interbank contagion models in working papers and
stress testing frameworks.
Despite widespread implementation and a rich history of
academic discourse over the topic, there is little to no literature
to examine whether or not interbank contagion models are
accurate predictors of systemic risk and whether they are worth
deriving conclusions from. Instead, studies thus far can be sub-
grouped into either theoretical work concerning the network
structure of the interbank market, or empirical work that only
draws applied results from theoretical models, without ever
verifying model accuracy in the first instance.
We believe this paper will address the aforementioned liter-
ature gap and make important contributions in determining
whether or not interbank contagion models are explanatory
and whether their implementation in regulatory contexts or
scope for further research is justified.
To validate our earlier claims, let us offer an overview of
existing literature with reference to methods and frameworks
incorporated in this paper.
On a theoretical level, much effort has been placed in under-
standing how the structure of interbank networks influences
the extent of contagion. Initial studies focused on foundational
concepts, such as work from Allen and Gale (2000) showing
that a complete network of interregional banks (where each is
linked to every other) is more resilient to liquidity shocks than
an incomplete one. Over time more complex analysis began to
emerge. Nier et. al (2007) used non-empirical networks with
ranges of key structure, probability and node size parameters
to test contagion effects, finding among other things that
the number of connections in a network can have dual effects
on contagion. Initially, as connections increase, their ability to
channel contagion increases alongside it; however, as connec-
tions increase past a certain large threshold, the newfound size
of the network allows for greater risk sharing among nodes
and decreases contagion considerably. Gai and Kapadia (2010)
followed the same probabilistic and endogenous approach
in Nier et. al (2007), but also introduced contagious effects
originating from the sale of illiquid assets during crises.
Much more importantly however, unlike previous literature,
they differentiated between the probability and the extent of
contagion. In doing so, they found that while the probability of
contagion increases and subsequently decreases hyperbolically
with network size, the extent of contagion spread increases
until it reaches an asymptote, implying that while for large
network sizes the probability of contagion is low, if contagion
occurs it would produce extremely large repercussions on the
system.
In our paper, among other questions, we will seek to under-
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2stand, in the context of the pre-financial crisis U.S. banking
system, whether contagion is positively or inversely related to
wider financial damage once a shock occurs.
Beyond theoretical studies on interbank market structure,
several seminal studies have formalized the broad concepts of
network structure in model form. The most widely adopted
interbank contagion model is that of Eisenberg and Noe
(2001), which proposes an iterative approach to network
contagion, relating the default in payments of a borrowing
bank to the devaluation in the assets of a lending bank, pro-
ducing a clearing vector of payments that brings the banking
system to equilibrium following successive periods of shock
transmission. Another foundational model was that of Furfine
(2003), which largely employs a similar contagion framework
to Eisenberg and Noe (2001), but requires an exogenous
trainable parameter for the recovery rate of payment defaults.
Model based papers of interbank contagion, compared to
theoretical studies of market structure and empirical studies,
are much less abundant. Since Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and
Furfine (2003), the most meaningful new interbank contagion
model advanced was that of Battiston et. al (2012), which
proposes an innovative model (named DebtRank) based on the
proportional propagation of contagion, in which banks would
transmit shocks not through defaulted payments as in previous
models but through gradual devaluation. They propose that
a given interbank loan will lose value proportionally to the
borrowing bank’s loss in equity, transmitting contagion even
before defaults occur.
In our paper, we have elected to adopt the DebtRank model
framework, believing it to be more encompassing and flexible
than alternative methods.
On an empirical level, many papers from the last decade have
sought to apply the aforementioned theoretical studies. Upper
and Worms (2004) produced an empirical network of interbank
linkages simulating the German banking system, finding that
in the worst-case scenario and omitting safety mechanisms
the failure of a single bank could cause the banking system to
lose up to 15% of its total assets. Degryse and Nguyen (2007)
took a more aggregate approach and, rather than focusing on
a single event or time period, used time series data for the
Belgian banking system between 1993 and 2002. They found
that contagion risk in the system had changed considerably
over time, increasing until 1997 and decreasing to a plateau
after. They also drew conclusions on network structure, finding
that Belgium’s shift from a complete network akin to that
of Allen and Gale (2000) to a more imperfectly connected
system of select large players and numerous small players
reduced contagion risk, arguing that the small banks could
now no longer originate contagion. This assumes the large
banks are fairly leveraged among each other, but as seen in
the 2008 financial crisis, this is not always the case. Following
a same national focus, Mistrulli (2011) tested for the extent of
contagion in the Italian banking sector using unique data for
the individual bilateral interbank assets and liabilities between
each bank, which in most literature including this study are
reconstructed using a maximum entropy framework. The paper
adopted its own methodology for contagion transmission and
applied a range of simulated shocks to draw conclusions on
how capital ratios correlate with contagion, finding among
other things that an increase in capital requirements does not
stymie contagion.
A large number of successive empirical papers, such as (Upper,
2011), (Georgescu, 2015) , (Liu, 2020), (Gabrieli & Salakhova,
2019) and (Leventides et. al, 2018), all apply real-world
financial inputs from sample countries or banking systems to
draw conclusions either on the extent of contagion potential in
those systems or the relationship between financial indicators,
network structure and contagion extent.
No empirical study has tested the validity of interbank con-
tagion as a field of study, instead accepting the models to
be accurate ex ante and drawing policy conclusions given
empirical inputs.
Additionally, due to the above, no study has also attempted to
compare the explanatory power of interbank contagion with
other systemic risk tools and predictors.
This paper aims primarily to address these fundamental unan-
swered questions about interbank contagion and assess firstly
whether it is at all effective as a systemic risk indicator, and
secondly whether it is more or less effective than other leading
systemic risk indicators.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. DebtRank Contagion Transmission
Many algorithms that model interbank contagion transmission
are present in the literature. In this study we have elected to
use DebtRank (Battiston et. al, 2012). Below, we will briefly
explain the structure of the DebtRank algorithm. Let us define
the assets and liabilities of every bank i in the system as the
sum of its external and interbank components:
Ai = A
ext
i +
n∑
j=0
Wij (1)
Li = L
ext
i +
n∑
i=0
Wij (2)
Where Wij is a matrix describing the loans (assets) extended
by every bank i to every other bank j. Thus the sum of its
rows,
∑n
j=0Wij , represents the total loans extended by bank
i to all other banks in the system and constitutes the bank’s
interbank assets. Aexti is a vector describing the total amount of
external assets, defined as the total amount of assets excluding
interbank assets (Aexti = Ai −
∑n
j=0Wij).
Consequently, let us define a bank’s equity as the surplus of
assets it holds:
Ei = Ai − Li (3)
We now assume a mechanism for shock propagation that
relates every bank to every other. We define a bank i’s
interbank assets in a given period as the interbank assets from
the previous period devalued by the relative loss in equity of
every other owing bank j:
W t+1ij = W
t
ij
Etj
Et−1j
(4)
3The logic behind the assumption is that as the equity of an
owing bank j decreases, it will directly devalue the loan it
received from bank i by that same proportional amount, as
its ability to repay has decreased by
Etj
Et−1j
. We can re-write
equation (4) in summative terms as:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij = (
n∑
j=0
W tij
Etj
Et−1j
) (5)
Using this new form, we can then define the change in
interbank asset value between consecutive periods as:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij −
n∑
j=0
W tij =
n∑
j=0
W tij
Etj
Et−1j
−
n∑
j=0
W tij (6)
Or:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij −
n∑
j=0
W tij =
n∑
j=0
(W tij
Etj
Et−1j
−W tij) (7)
Which can be rewritten to be:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij −
n∑
j=0
W tij =
n∑
j=0
W tij(
Etj
Et−1j
− 1) (8)
And further:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij −
n∑
j=0
W tij =
n∑
j=0
W tij
Etj − Et−1j
Et−1j
(9)
Let us now assume that external assets and liabilities remain
unchanged, which according to the original equity identity (3)
only allows interbank assets to change. We can hence draw
an equivalency between interbank asset changes and equity
changes, as all else remains constant:
n∑
j=0
W t+1ij −
n∑
j=0
W tij = E
t+1
i − Eti (10)
This allows us to re-write equation (9) as:
Et+1i − Eti =
n∑
j=0
W tij
Etj − Et−1j
Et−1j
(11)
Or:
Et+1i − Eti =
n∑
j=0
W tij
Et−1j
(Etj − Et−1j ) (12)
The term
W tij
Et−1j
’s period t, is set to zero such that both the
interbank assets of bank i and the change in bank j’s equity
between consecutive periods are relativized to their original
values. At every period t the entire term is set to zero if a
bank is insolvent or to itself otherwise:
ϕtij =

W 0ij
E0j
if Ei ≥ 0
0 if Ei < 0
We can then conclusively write the DebtRank model as:
Et+1i = max(0 | Eti +
n∑
j=0
ϕtij(E
t
j − Et−1j )) (13)
At every iteration period, the model defines the equity of
a bank, Et+1i , by removing the devaluation in its interbank
assets,
∑n
j=0 ϕ
t
ij(E
t
j − Et−1j ), from the previous period’s
equity, Etj . If the devaluation is such that the bank’s equity
turns negative and the bank defaults, the model stores a value
of zero instead.
The model iterates through consecutive periods until the
relative difference in equity between consecutive periods is
smaller than a certain threshold α:
Et+1i − Eti
Eti
< α (14)
B. DebtRank Linearity Coefficient
In the previous section, DebtRank’s shocks are propagated
linearly according to the assumed propagation mechanism in
equation (4). In this mechanism a percentage change in the
equity of an owing bank j results in a corresponding percentage
change in the interbank assets of a receiving bank i, implying
the relationship between the two is linear and one to one. A
modification to the model can be applied by the insertion of
a coefficient β in equation (14):
Et+1i = max(0 | Eti +
n∑
j=0
ϕtijβ(E
t
j − Et−1j )) (15)
Such that a percentage change in the equity of an owing
bank j now results in a corresponding β percent change in
the interbank assets of a receiving bank i, since:
ϕtijβ
(
Etj − Et−1j
)
=
W tij
Et−1j
βEtj − Et−1j =W
t
ijβ
Etj − Et−1j
Et−1j
(16)
This maintains the linearity in the proportion between one
bank’s equity and another’s interbank assets but varies the
gradient in the proportion.
C. Contagion Proxy
The conventional output of the DebtRank algorithm is a sol-
vency vector σi describing whether each bank i is solvent or
not. This constitutes a binary output, which limits contagion as
a categorical variable. To produce a continuous variable with a
richer information set, we define a proxy value for contagion as
the percentage difference between the final equity state Efinali
and the initial post-shock equity state Epost−shocki :
Contagion Proxy =
Efinali − Epost−shocki
Epost−shocki
100 (17)
This metric produces an isolated measure of the equity lost by
each bank i that is solely attributable to contagion, excluding
the initial shock.
4D. Variable Setup
The general testing framework consists in the formulation of
established explanatory X attributes in bank default prediction,
namely:
• Return on Assets (ROA).
• Return on Equity (ROE).
• Past Due Short-Term Loan Book Value on Total Assets
(Short Term Bad Loans as a percentage of Assets).
• TIER 1 Capital Ratio.
• TIER 1 Leverage Capital Ratio.
To these, we append an additional explanatory X attribute
representing the output of the previously outlined DebtRank
algorithm, hereafter referred to as the:
• Contagion Proxy.
All X attributes are tied to a binary dependant variable Y
(taking 0 and 1 values) signifying whether each analysed bank
has failed (0) or not (1). The high-level aim of the study is
to verify for additional significance and explanatory power
derived by the Contagion Proxy with respect to established
variables. To increase dimensionality, each attribute has 4
quarterly readings, resulting in 24 total X attributes.
E. Method of Default Classification and Prediction
Two machine learning classifiers will be used to predict the
default Y outcome, given previously outlined X attributes. An
overview of how each is applied is provided below.
1. Neural Networks
Neural Networks have been widely applied in economics and
finance with considerable success in a variety of use cases.
They present advantages in their mapping of more complex,
non-linear functions of X attributes, thus in this study they will
be employed as a measure of hypothesized best classification
performance. The shortcoming of neural networks however is
their lack of transparency in variable significance. In this study
we have elected to apply simple sensitivity analysis of the
inputs through gradient descent to gauge explanatory power.
1.1 Neural Network Setup
Several elements of the network have been kept constant. The
network consists of three hidden layers, all of which have
ReLU activations, and a single sigmoid activation (for binary
classification) node as its output layer. Two dropout layers
are present after the first and second hidden layer with a 10
percent dropout probability. Weights are initialized according
to a random truncated normal distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation 0.2, while biases are initialized to 0.
1.2 Neural Network Tuning
Data was split into training, validation and testing in equal
thirds. All data was normalized using a Robust Scaler. The
model trains on the training data, then selects the best com-
bination of hyper-parameters based on accuracy performance
in the validation set. The hyperparameters were combinations
of:
Hidden Layer Structure ∈ ([8, 16, 8], [4, 8, 16], [16, 8, 4]).
Solver ∈ (Stochastic Gradient Descent, Adam, RMSProp).
Learning Rate ∈ (0.001, 0.05, 0.1).
Once an ideal combination is identified, the model is re-trained
using the tuned hyperparameters and evaluated Out-Of-Sample
(OOS) on the testing dataset to obtain final performance.
1.3 Neural Network Sensitivity Analysis
The model obtained in tuning represents our final, optimized
neural network. It contains the fully backpropagated weights
and biases that guaranteed it the lowest losses in binary cross
entropy. We are now interested in the explanatory power of
each input in the network. We can obtain an indication of this
through gradient descent. Let us provide a brief summary of
the former and state key terms. A representation of our model,
using a sample [16, 8, 4] node hidden layer architecture is
presented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: Sample neural network model.
The model has an input layer consisting of 24 nodes, one for
each explanatory X attribute we included in our dataset. Let
us denote the input layer, subsequent three hidden layers and
output layer by the index j = 1:5. Let us further denote the
number of nodes in each layer, starting from the top, by the
index i = 1:n, where n is the last node. Let us also define some
key network components:
• W ji,k: The weight in layer j, connecting the i-th node in
layer j to the k-th node in layer j+1.
• Zj,i: The input value at layer j that is fed into node i. This
term is the sum of the product between each preceding
layer’s node and the weight that joins it to i.
• Aj,i: The activation function with Zj,i as input, such that
Aj,i = f(Zj,i), for some function f.
We can now more fully define Zj,i as:
Zj,i =
n∑
i=1
W j−1i,k · Aj−1,i (18)
Fig. 2 re-creates the network in Fig. 1 for just one input node
who’s effect on the model we want to assess.
5Fig. 2: Sample backpropagation path (highlighted in blue)
for a given forward pass from a single neuron to the next
layer’s single neuron through to output (Y).
The marginal effect of this input node on the final output Y is
determined by the marginal effect on each subsequent weight
and node it is connected to. To understand that general effect,
let us begin with the local marginal effect on just one specific
path in the network. We take the highlighted path in light
blue from Fig. 2, going from the input node to the first node of
each subsequent layer. Thus, we move from the input, or A1,1,
to Z2,1 to A2,1 to Z3,1 to the final sigmoid activation A5,1
and the output Y. The final output Y depends on the previous
sigmoid activation A5,1 with one-to-one transmission. Thus a
unit change in A5,1 will result in a unit change in Y, or in
symbolic terms:
dY
dA5,1
= 1 (19)
Working backwards, the activation in the fifth layer, depends
on its input in the same layer, formalized as:
dA5,1
dZ5,1
(20)
Then by chain rule, we can say that the output depends on the
aforementioned input according to:
dY
dA5,1
· dA5,1
dZ5,1
(21)
We can keep extending the chain rule backwards along the
path until we arrive to the first input A1,1:
dY
dA5,1
· dA5,1
dZ5,1
· dZ5,1
dA4,1
· dA4,1
dZ4,1
· dZ4,1
dA3,1
· dA3,1
dZ3,1
· dZ3,1
dA2,1
· dA2,1
dZ2,1
· dZ2,1
dA1,1
(22)
Or:
dY
dA5,1
·
2∏
j=5
dAj,1
dZj,1
· dZj,1
dAj−1, 1
(23)
Which tells us how a unit change in the input, will affect the
output Y for this particular path. To understand how the same
unit change will affect the output Y across all possible paths
generated by the input, we simply sum the gradients of each
path:
for a given input node I:
dY
dA1,I
= 0
for a given second layer input node ∈ (1, 2, 3 ... N):
for a given third layer input node ∈ (1, 2, 3 ... M):
for a given fourth layer input node ∈ (1, 2, 3 ... O):
dY
dA1,I
= dYdA1,I +
dY
dA5,1
· dA5,1dZ5,1 ·
dZ5,1
dA4,m
· dA4,mdZ4,m ·
dZ4,m
dA3,k
·
dA3,k
dZ3,k
· dZ3,kdA2,p ·
dA2,p
dZ2,p
· dZ2,pdA1,I
Where N, M and O represent the number of nodes in the
second, third and fourth layer respectively.
We will later report our findings according to this methodol-
ogy, resulting in a single gradient for each input variable/node,
quantifying how a unit change in the input A1,I affects the
output Y.
To elaborate on the components above, the derivative of the
input to a given node k in a given layer j with respect to the
previous layer’s j-1 activation from node i, dZj,kdAj−1,i , is given
by the previous layer’s weight from node i to node k, since:
d
( ∑n
i=1W
j−1
i,k · Aj−1,i
)
dAj−1,i
= W j−1i,k (24)
The activation function derivatives with respect to the input,
dAj,k
dZj,i
, are simply the gradients of the functions themselves. In
our case, all hidden layers contain ReLU activations, which
are defined as:
ReLU (Zj,i) =
{
0 for Zj,i < 0
Zj,i for Zj,i ≥ 0
With a gradient of:
dAj,k
dZj,i
=
d(ReLU (Zj,i))
dZj,i
=
{
1 for Zj,i > 0
0 for Zj,i ≤ 0
The final layer’s activation is a sigmoid function, to smoothen
outputs for binary classification. The sigmoid function is
defined as:
Sigmoid (Zj,i) =
1
1 + e−Zj,i
(25)
With a gradient of:
dAj,k
dZj,i
=
d(Sigmoid (Zj,i))
dZj,i
=
eZj,i
(1 + eZj,i)
2 (26)
Results obtained through these gradients will reveal the sen-
sitivity of the output to each of the inputs in the study.
2. Logistic Regression
Logistic regression models are used extensively in financial
literature concerning default prediction and can be viewed
6as a reliable baseline for this type of analysis. We employ
them due to their greater transparency in both coefficient and
significance analysis.
Logistic models are non-linear and follow a log of the odds
specification:
log
P (X)
1− P (X) =
K∑
j=0
bjxj (27)
Where, P(X) is the probability of default, bj is the regres-
sion’s j-th coefficient and xj is the regression’s j-th variable.
Exponentiating both sides to the base of e results in a more
interpretable specification of:
P (X)
1− P (X) = e
∑K
j=0 bjxj (28)
Or:
P (X)
1− P (X) =
K∏
j=0
ebjxj (29)
Where the left-hand side of the equation represents the odds
of P(X) occurring (the probability of X happening over it
not happening), while the right-hand side is the product of
the exponentiation of each regressor. The interpretation of the
model is thus that a one unit change in the value of some
variable xj will result in an ebj fold increase in the odds of
P(X) occurring.
Our use of logistic regressions will be two-layered in this
study:
Our particular use of logistic regression will also involve the
application of a Lasso penalty to observe (a) if contagion
remains among the significant variables (b) the magnitude and
direction of its coefficients.
F. Testing Framework
We begin the study by selecting a period of observation during
which we want to record attributes. This period is the crash
from the financial crisis and the first stages of its recovery,
i.e. all four quarters from 2009. We do this with a view of
predicting defaults occurring right after the aforementioned
period. It would be reasonable to predict defaults from imme-
diately after or during the crash, however the entire notion
of interbank contagion is to identify the defaults of banks
that don’t immediately become insolvent during a crash, but
might eventually become insolvent later as a result of prior
immediate defaults. Hence we apply a lag that leads us to
also include some recovery months as predictor periods.
In the stated 2009 window, we have attribute data on some
7,000 commercial banks in the U.S. financial system (only
banks which remained solvent and as standalone entities for
the entire period were included in this study). We then seek
to identify which of these attributes caused certain banks to
fail and others to remain solvent.
We ascertained we have a number of X attributes for these
observations/banks over the specified period, but we require
a Y label to discern whether they failed or not and whether
the X attributes can predict such an event. As we will record
X attribute data right up until the end of 2009, we will
aim to predict bank defaults over the first quarter of 2010
(the successive data period). We used a separate dataset to
retrospectively label all 7,000 banks in the 2009 yearly window
as either still solvent in the first quarter of 2010 (1) or insolvent
(0). The general framework of the study is to train a model
on the X attributes in the 2009 window to predict the binary
2010 default state. The problem is framed cross sectionally.
The model is trained In-Sample (IS) on a subset of the banks
(as opposed to using all banks but a subset of the overall
time period) to optimize parameters and tested Out-Of-Sample
(OOS) on a separate leftover subset of the banks. Overall
predictive performance is observed on this leftover sample.
The study will present findings on whether financial attributes,
including contagion, up to a 1 year lag had any, and which,
influence on default.
Note on Class Balance
For each failed bank in our system there are roughly 50 non-
failed banks, meaning our raw dataset is imbalanced and a
classifier that labels all test samples as non-failed will be
highly accurate without producing insight. To remedy this, we
adopt a nave random oversampling of the minority class (failed
banks) with replacement until comparable to the majority one.
To reduce computation times and to avoid excessive simplifi-
cation of attributes in the oversampled class, we have reduced
the overall dimensionality of the data to 1000 observations,
evenly split between failed and non-failed institutions.
III. DATA
Data has been chiefly sourced from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC, 2019). The FFIEC
provides datasets with balance sheet information on all United
States commercial banks at quarterly intervals. Tailored code
has been developed to compile and clean the semi-structured
quarterly entries into a new, never before used, time-series
dataset for each attribute mentioned in the Variable Setup
section over a period of 2001-2018 (This constitutes a raw first
entry of this study’s X variables). A secondary source of data
originates from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC, 2019), which produces a list of all failed U.S. banks.
The unique identifiers from the FDIC’s dataset were matched
to the FFIEC’s, such that failed banks in the FFIEC dataset
would take on a value of 1 and non-failed banks would
take a value of 0. (This constitutes the Y dependant variable
we would look to predict) A data dictionary for variable
abbreviations can be found at the Federal Reserve’s Micro
Data Reference Manual (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2018). We gathered all dataset variables
necessary to either simulate or define the variables mentioned
in the earlier model methodology. The data gathered was suffi-
cient, but at times required manipulation. Interbank liabilities,
for instance, had to be derived using related data, requiring
the assumption of a closed interbank system. Additionally,
interbank data included information on the total interbank
assets and liabilities of each bank, but not the interbank assets
and liabilities of each bank with respect to every other, which
is necessary to test contagion.
7Fig. 3: Correlation matrix of each attribute against every other. Attributes are substituted with number keys in the left table
with a key dictionary table on the right. Coefficients in the correlation matrix are color coated according to a criterion that
highlights high correlations in red, whether positive or negative, leaving more uncorrelated readings in lighter hue.
We hence applied a maximum entropy reconstruction algo-
rithm (Anand et. al, 2015) capable of approximating the neces-
sary data. At odd (31), n+1, and even (30), n, iteration intervals
the algorithm normalizes the earlier introduced interbank asset
matrix Wij to its total interbank assets (for iteration n) or
liabilities (for n+1) to then multiply it by the observed total
interbank assets (for n) or liabilities (for n+1) from the FFIEC
dataset. In other words, this process rescales the rows and
columns of the matrix to the dataset’s aggregate values until
a convergence is reached:
Wnij =
Wn−1ij∑
j W
n−1
ij
IAFFIECi (30)
Wn+1ij =
Wnij∑
i W
n
ij
ILFFIECj (31)
The FFIEC data is used to iterate this paper’s selected
contagion models and its predicted defaults are compared
with observed defaults from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation’s Failed Bank List (FDIC, 2019) to generate
conclusions.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Preliminary Analysis of Variable Correlations
Before analysing our model outputs, this section will cover
some initial correlation analysis of studied attributes. Fig. 3
outlines correlation coefficients of each attribute in our study
with respect to every other. We find generally that every
attribute, with the exception of Return on Equity (keys 5 to 9),
is highly autocorrelated across lags. In this regard, Return on
Assets, Tier 1 Capital Ratio (RCON7206) and Tier 1 Leverage
Capital Ratio (RCON7204) perform worst, while Contagion
and Short Term Past Due loans perform moderately better but
still considerably below Return on Equity. In terms of cross
attribute correlation, the picture changes. Predictably, Return
on Equity is highly positively correlated with Return on Assets
and moderately inversely related to Short Term Past Due loans.
Short Term Past Due loans are strongly inversely correlated
with Return on Assets and RCON7204. Return on Assets
is highly positively correlated with Return on Equity and
RCON7204. RCON7204 is highly positively correlated with
Return on Assets and inversely correlated with Short Term
Past Due loans. Finally, out of all attributes studied, Contagion
and RCON7206 are the only two attributes to be largely
uncorrelated with every other attribute, outside of its own lags,
pointing to the high value they may bring into any analysis
that involves these composite metrics. In particular, contagion
is exceptionally uncorrelated, with no correlation coefficient
having an absolute value magnitude greater than 0.05 exclud-
ing lag coefficients. We summarize from this preliminary data
analysis that contagion has promising qualities that may bring
additional uncorrelated explanatory power to future regression
analysis. We also conclude that some attributes have sizeable
amounts of cross correlation with other attributes, and all
attributes have a moderate to high degree of autocorrelation in
their lags, hence dimensionality reduction methods will later
be applied to avoid collinearity.
B. Neural Network Results
Model Details
A neural network was tuned In-Sample and tested Out-Of-
Sample for the purpose of variable analysis. We report the
specifications of the final OOS tuned model in Table I.
The tuning resulted in an ideal learning rate of 0.01 combined
with an RMSprop solver and a pyramid architecture of 32, 16
and 8 nodes over three hidden layers. The model performed
extremely well in default detection with 97.74 percent accu-
racy, meaning the vast majority of observations were correctly
classified as either having remained solvent or failed in the first
quarter of 2010. The high performance implies weights and
8Hidden
Layer
Structure
Solver Learning
Rate
OOS Ac-
curacy
(32, 16, 8) RMSprop 0.01 97.74%
TABLE I: Classification accuracy and model specification of
tuned OOS neural network model.
magnitudes within the model are reliable indicators of how
each variable affects default.
Sensitivity Analysis
As outlined in the methodology, we applied gradient descent
to obtain derivatives of the network’s output with respect to
its inputs and gauge explanatory power. Table II reports our
findings on a variable per variable basis.
Variable/Attribute Output Gradient w.r.t
Input:
(
dY
dA1,1
)
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 1, 2009 0.002
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.008
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 3, 2009 0.002
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 4, 2009 0.027
ROE - Quarter 1, 2009 0.041
ROE - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.028
ROE - Quarter 3, 2009 -0.018
ROE - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.019
ROA - Quarter 1, 2009 0.006
ROA - Quarter 2, 2009 0.000
ROA - Quarter 3, 2009 0.002
ROA - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.064
RCON7206 - Quarter 1, 2009 0.006
RCON7206 - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.009
RCON7206 - Quarter 3, 2009 -0.007
RCON7206 - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.019
RCON7204 - Quarter 1, 2009 0.003
RCON7204 - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.209
RCON7204 - Quarter 3, 2009 -0.013
RCON7204 - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.295
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 1, 2009 -0.005
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.009
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 3, 2009 0.002
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.029
TABLE II: Gradients of network’s output value with respect
to listed input variable.
Before analysing the impact of contagion, let us generally
describe the model and the overall structural integrity of the
magnitude and direction of gradients, ensuring the model is
broadly consistent with theory if it is to be used as a reliable
benchmark for a novel attribute.
We would generally expect for Return on Equity (ROE) and
Return on Assets (ROA) to be inversely correlated with default
probability, meaning an increase in either results in lower
chances of bankruptcy. The model broadly supports this, as
three out of the four ROE entries have a negative gradient,
signifying that an increase in ROE results in a decrease in the
final 0 to 1 Y output closer to 0 where a solvent classification
is more likely. ROA is more conflicting, as two of its readings
have a negative gradient and two have a positive one, however
the magnitude of its most significant reading (Quarter 4) is
ten times larger than any of its other entries, signifying a net
effect of inverse correlation with default. Short Term Past Due
loans should be positively correlated with default, as a higher
proportion of bad loans raises loss provisions, limiting banks’
capital. This is confirmed by the data, with three of its four
entries having positive gradients of much larger magnitude
than its one negative reading. The two capital ratios, TIER
1 Leverage Capital Ratio (RCON7204) and TIER 1 Capital
Ratio (RCON7206) should produce inverse correlations with
default, as the metrics measure a bank’s liquid capital buffer
(where a higher ratio indicates a larger buffer). This is once
again confirmed by the data as both have negative gradients for
three out of four of their entries and insignificant magnitudes
for their individual positive readings. Having ascertained the
model is structurally consistent, let us analyse the magnitude
and direction of contagion.
The Contagion Proxy would be expected to be inversely
related to default, as it represents the equity lost due to
contagion (note this value is negative). This means an increase
in its reading mathematically represents a lower equity loss,
thus a lower exposure to contagion and thus a lower default
probability. We can confirm that this is the case, as three
out of four contagion readings have a negative gradient and
their magnitudes greatly overshadow that of its only positive
gradient.
In addition to correct directionality, the Contagion Proxy also
boasts extremely large gradients, where a higher gradient im-
plies higher variable importance and impact on model output.
Among variables with a negative gradient (15 variables) its
reading for Quarter 4 of 2009 is the fourth largest by mag-
nitude, coming after the second and fourth quarter readings
of RCON7204 and the fourth quarter reading of Return on
Assets. Most notably, the former contagion reading has larger
gradients than any of the TIER 1 Capital Ratio (RCON7206)
entries, representing confirmation within the context of this
model that contagion can play a larger role in default predic-
tion than long established gold standard predictors.
C. Logistic Regression Results
A logistic model was fit to the study’s 24 attributes alongside
a Lasso regularization penalty to reduce dimensionality, co-
linearity and increase significance of retained variables.
Table III outlines our findings. The model’s directionality is
structurally consistent. Short Term Past Due loans are correctly
directly proportional to odds of default, while Return on
Equity, TIER 1 Capital Ratio (RCON7206), TIER 1 Leverage
Capital Ratio (RCON7204) and the Contagion Proxy are cor-
rectly inversely proportional according to existing discussion
in the Neural Network Results section of this study. Having
established this, we may further analyse the model and the
role of contagion in it.
The applied Lasso regularization reduced the number of anal-
ysed attributes from 24 to 7. The substantial penalty implies
that any retained variable can be assumed to be very impactful
on default. Many attributes suffered heavy reductions, with all
but Return on Equity (ROE) being limited to a single entry per
metric. Return on Assets (ROA) has notably been discarded
entirely. Contagion has been retained in the model with a
single entry, offering an initial endorsement of its utility in
the context of this model.
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Variable/Attribute (Yearly) Log of the Odds Coefficient Z Distribution P-Value
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 1, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 2, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 3, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Short Term Past Due - Quarter 4, 2009 0.0498 0.2671
ROE - Quarter 1, 2009 Lasso Reduced
ROE - Quarter 2, 2009 -0.4107 0.0002*
ROE - Quarter 3, 2009 -0.0521 0.3879
ROE - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.106 0.0290*
ROA - Quarter 1, 2009 Lasso Reduced
ROA - Quarter 2, 2009 Lasso Reduced
ROA - Quarter 3, 2009 Lasso Reduced
ROA - Quarter 4, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7206 - Quarter 1, 2009 -0.0776 0.4007
RCON7206 - Quarter 2, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7206 - Quarter 3, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7206 - Quarter 4, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7204 - Quarter 1, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7204 - Quarter 2, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7204 - Quarter 3, 2009 Lasso Reduced
RCON7204 - Quarter 4, 2009 -1.8492 0.0000*
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 1, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 2, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 3, 2009 Lasso Reduced
Contagion Proxy - Quarter 4, 2009 -0.1489 0.0018*
TABLE III: Coefficients from Logistic Regression following Lasso penalty. 24 original attributes reduced to 7 post-penalty.
(*) Variable is significant at 95 percent confidence level.
To further elaborate, the Contagion Proxy’s reading for the
fourth quarter of 2009 yields a coefficient of -0.1489, which
implies a one unit (standard normal intervals) increment in
the Contagion Proxy would result in a e−0.1489 ≈ 0.86
factor multiplication (reduction) in the odds of default, ceteris
paribus. Recall, as mentioned in the preceding Neural Network
Results section, that a mathematical one unit increase in the
Contagion Proxy denotes a decrease in contagion exposure,
given the proxy measures negative equity loss from conta-
gion. The metric’s coefficient is the third largest in absolute
magnitude across the regression, ranking ahead of two of the
three Return on Equity readings and the individual RCON7206
reading for same sign metrics. It is also extremely significant,
with a Z-distributed p-value of 0.0018, representing the second
most significant p-value in the regression, following only
RCON7204’s reading of 5.19 · 10−16.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper sought to explore the utility of interbank contagion
as a default metric and more generally verify for its explana-
tory power and significance in the wider context of more
established financial variables of interest. We adopted two
default model frameworks, the first involving neural networks
and the second involving logistic regression. In the former,
we concluded contagion has high explanatory power with
gradient magnitudes exceeding those of the TIER 1 Capital
Ratio and correct correlation with default with greater
contagion exposure being associated with greater odds of
default.
In the logistic framework, we also concluded contagion to be
highly explanatory with a coefficient ranking third out of
seven attributes by magnitude in a Lasso reduced model and
correctly correlated with default. We hence summarize that not
only contagion plays a clear role in bank default analysis, but
that it is capable of even superseding the explanatory power
and significance of far more established variables, justifying
far greater interest in its analysis and application to stress
testing, risk management and default prediction.
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